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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
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Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF
1.

Judicial Notice.

Respondents criticize appellants for calling to the
attention of the Court the report of a Congressional
Committee which embodied a report to such Committee
by the Governmental Agency charged with the responsibili'ty of making the subsidy payments pursuant to
the Act of Congress.
1
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Appellants are not conscious of any impropriety in
so doing:
This Honorable Court will take judicial notice of
the true signification of all English words and phrases,
of the public and private official acts of the legislative,
executive, and judicial departments o.f the United States,
and of the political history of the world. In all such
cases "the Court may resort for its aid to appropriate
books or documents of reference.'' Section 104-46-1,
Utah Code Annotated, 1943.
''The courts may also take notice of the mischief the laws were intended to remedy and of the
public demand preceding their passage, and they
may, with propriety, recur to the history of the
times when the statute was passed to ascertain
the reason as well as the meaning of particular
provisions therein . . . ' '
(20 Am. Jur. Evidence, § 41)

Thus in Outlet Embroidery Co. v. Derwent Mills, 254
N. Y. 179, 70 A.L.R. 1440, the Court took judicial notice
that at the time a contract for the sale of goods to be
imported was entered into, Congress was debating a new
tariff and 'that the debate continued for a year.
In earlier cases involving subsidy payments this
Honorable Court did take such notice of the actions
taken by the government during the course of the last
war, including the premium payment plan. (Combined
Metals Reductions Co. v. State Tax Commission, 176
P. 2d 614.)

2
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2.

An Argument Exploded.

Respondents avoid rather than n1eet appellants'
arglnuents by reiterating the premise of the former sub;::idy tax eases, stating (p. 10) :

·' * * * Throughout the entire program, both
before Rule 13 was a1nended and afterward, the
premilun payments were made as a part of the
actual total price authorized and pursuant to the
premium price plan inaugurated jointly bT the
Federal Loan Agency, the War Production Board
and the Office of Price Administration. In other
words, under O.P.A. regulations made in conjunction with ·the 'Var Production Board the
prices permitted to be paid for the metals were
the ceiling prices plus the premium price. And
the two of them together constituted the selling
price of the ores and metals. The one was never
divorced from the other. * * * " (Italics ours.)
One might think it strange for counsel to persist
in this contention on the basis of the information now
before the court in these cases, and the facts admitted
to be true by the demurrers below.
And when price controls were discontinued in 1945,
while the subsidies continued into 1947, how can respondents argue ''The one was never divorced from the
other''? Not even a shadow of basis for this argument
continued after metal price controls went out of the
window.
Respondents just beg the question in baldly asserting (p. 10) that "the prices permitted to be paid for
the metals ·were the ceiling prices plus the premium

3
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price. And the two of them together constituted the
selling price of the ores and metals.''
3.

The Basis For The Subsidies.

Appellants have never advanced the "absurd"
straw man that the subsidies-" so-called" by Congress
which authorized their payment-were "outright gifts."
(P. 5, 7)
On the contrary, appellants contend that the subsidies paid were increased in direct ratio to the need of
each particular mine for more money than could be realized from a sale or conversion into money or its equivalent of that mine's ores; they were paid, in the words of
Congress, ''to obtain the maximum necessary production" from the miners of this country.
It follows that since such subsidies are the opposite
of proceeds from the sale of ores, and no part of the
value thereof, the payments may not be considered "in
arriving at a proper tax base.''
Respondents at page
recognize this when they
ments by quoting from a
the allowance of bounties

7 of their brief momentarily
aptly characterize such paycase in which one reason for
was given as '' produc~t~on 10'r

manru,facture t1o be stimulated.''
4.

Respondents' Consideration of Revised Rule 13.
(P. 8)

Original Rule 13 of the quota committee provided
with respect to ores sold that premium payments would
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be ''based upon metal paid for under settlement contracts·'. ( \Ye assume the court will take judicial notice
pf the fact that in the cases where ores are sold, the
~ales are to buyers under settlement coll'tracts, i.e., contracts specifying the basis of settlement.)
\Yith respect to ores not so sold the rule provided
that premium payments would be based on stated percentages of the metal content.
In the case of Combined ~1:etals Reduction Co. et al
\~s. State Tax Co1nn1ission, this Honorable Court, looking to the first part of the rule-that relating to ores
sold-said it was self-evident that metals were not paid
for under settlement contracts unless they were sold.
Then the court added that since it appears (from the
records in those particular cases) that the ''premium
prices'' paid to mining companies were for metals sold
hy them, it followed that such premium prices were includable as money received on a sale. The majority
of the court felt that cases where ores were not so sold
were not then before this court.
The decision of the court was accordingly based
squarely upon the quoted provision of Original Rule 13,
for the court recognized that under our statute the basis
for determining the amount of taxes due where there
has been a sale of ore under a bon~ fide contract of
sale is the amount of money or its equivalent actually received from the sale.
From the records in these cases now before the
court involving ore sales it now appears that Original
Rule 13 was rescinded, and a new rule adopted under

5
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\\·hich subsidy payments were based on certain st'at·ed
Jlercentages for the .respective met,als reg,ardless of the
1w rcenta.ges actually recovered or paid for.
Copies of the original and revised rules are attached
as exhibits to the complaints. From these exhibits it
appears that under the Revised Rule, even in the case of
custom ores, payment of bounties was not "conditioned
uE a sale'' ;-1J.1uch less were such bounties '' recei~.red on
a sale".
Respondents would have the court ignore the rescission of old rule 13 and the adoption of a new and different rule.
On page 10 of their brief respondents now recognize that under Original Rule 13 a different method of
computing premium payments was provided wherre no
settlement oontr:acts existed. Such method is set forth
in the instructions of Metals Reserve Company attached
as Exhibit D to the complaint of 'the United States Smelting Refining and Mining Company in Case No. 7324,
which exhibit, together with the copies of affidavits attached, show that bonuses were paid on the basis of
mine production records and before any sale.
In the same complaint it is alleged 'that such bonuses
were paid unconditionally and without any right on the
part of the agency of the Federal Government paying
the same to receive back the premiums paid in the event
the metals recovered from 'the ores for the production
of which such subsidies were paid became lost, destroyed,
\Yere retained by the company or otherwise failed to
enter the channels of commerce. Yet respondents ask
6
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the coi.ut to believe that such bonuses were received ''on
a sn.1e''.
On the same pag·e respondents say there i~ nothing to indicate that the purpose of 1naking premium
pay1nents was changed by Amended Rule- 13. We agree:
t?1e purpose of making such payments was specified by
Congress, i.e., to obtai.n the maxi.mum necessary prodt~c
tioJz.

The conditions of pay1nent were, however, within
the culHl'Ol Ol the adlllinisti:aci.ve agency. Tliat agency
saw fit to rescind that part of Rule 13 requiring as a
condition of pay1nent that certain ores be sold. It prescribed in lieu thereof that the quanti'ties of n1etals
prod1.tced be determined, as the basis for subsidy payments.

u.

The Kennecott and Similar Situations.

Let us assume for this argument that Utah's statutes
in question should be construed broadly 1agairnst the taxpayer; and thus that the Legislature had in mind when
it used the particular words in these statutes that proceeds or amounts realized from the sale of ores, etc.,
should include subsidies, bonuses or bounties, when tied
into the purchase price for the s~ale of these ores. This
apparently was the reasoning of the majority of the
court in the Combined Metals and Haynes decisions
based upon the records in the first series of cases submitted to this court.
Is this court now willing to press this line of rea-
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soning to the point of creating liability in cases such
as that of Kennecott, where no sale of the ores, on the
increased produC'tion of which the subsidies were computed and paid, eve.r took place at all?
In such cases the first part of Rule 13 never did
apply, either as originally promulgated and heretofore
relied on by this court, or after revision. Further, the
records in these cases now before the court, with the
material facts pleaded by appellants in cooperation with
counsel for respondents and admitted by demurrer,
show:
(a)
paid.

The precise basis on which the subsidies were

(b) That this basis was not the tons of ore :sold,
but the excess-over-quota production of ore.
(c) When the computations for subsidy payments
on such basis were made each month, the payments
occurred in due course entirely apart from the subsequent treatment and disposition of those excess ores.
For example are the familiar Kennecott souvenir beehives, where no sale has ever taken place even of the refined copper.
This indeed is a far cry from the other type of case
where the same smelter, buying the ores, paid to the
seller both the sales price and on behalf of the Government the subsidy as a premium price, both computed
on the same ores as delivered and sold. If one is willing to abrogate the familiar rule of strict construction
in favor of the taxpayer, to assume a legislative pre-

8
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.3cience anticipating then unknown conditions, and to
look to the· particular administrative restrictions and
policies in such cases rather than the intent of Congress
i:r;t its authorization for the payn1ent of production
bonuses, then there is son1ething to be said for tax liability in such cases.
But even so-a position which we respectfully submit is in error-in the entirely different situations such
as those of the United States Smelting Company and
Kennecott, is not the court being asked to legislate judicially under any standard, and frankly to rewrite these
tax statutes in the interests of a possible need for increased revenue~
In their brief (p. 11) respondents do not and cannot meet this; so they avoid the entire argument by saying (1) these facts are "conclusions of law"; and (2)
the affidavit attached to the complaint shows by the selection of one word therein that the subsidy payments
were for the sale of the ores.
"\Ve can only respectfully request the court to read
the concise, simple amended complaint-in effect the
entire record-in the Kennecott and similar cases, and
then treat respondents' evasive agrument on its merit.
It is true that the one word of the particular affidavit
attached to the Kennecott complaint as illustrative was
not as otherwise throughout, changed from "sold"; but
if this court is to pin its decision on that point in view
of the picture as otherwise pleaded and as was the fact,
Kennecott is willing to let the matter rest on the consciences of those concerned.
9
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6.

The Inclusion of Subsidy Paym·ents in Ueterrnining
Net Proceeds Valuation. ('P. 13)

Although respondents so entitle the first subdivision of their brief as to purportedly refer to the inclusion of bonuses in determining the mine occupation tax,
it will be noted that often the argument is directed
equally to such inclusion in arriving at net proceeds. We
have followed respondents in this, since in large part
obviously the same rules are applicable.
Under subdivision 2 of their brief, respondents make
three points directed to the inclusion of premium payTnents in determining gross proceeds and thereby fixing
the assessed value of mines. These are as follows:
a. "Under the Utah statutes the base for determining the taxes from mines includes what is annually
realized from the product of the mine, over and above
the cost of expenses of obtaining such proceeds and includes the value of the ore, etc., produced but not sold
during the year."
This statement is obviously unwarranted in fact as
a reference to the statute will readily disclose. Only
when ores, produced but not sold, have been converted
into the equivalent of· money are they to be included in
arriving at net proceeds.
The one case dealing with this is that of Salt Lake
Count~T vs. Utah Copper Co., 93 Fed. 2d. 127, in which
the question was whether "blister copper", gold and
silver bullion produced in the preceding calendar year
but remaining unsold, as well as the amount received
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fron1 ~ales in the preceding calendar year of ores produced, should be included in computing gross proceeds.
It was not even contended that ores mined but not
processed ~hould so be included. The Court held that
such blister copper and gold and silver bullion should
be included, saying:
'· 'Blister copper' is copper that has passed
through the smelting- process, metallic copper of
a black blistered surface, or final product of converting copper matte, and is about 96-99 per cent
pure. The simple meaning of 'money' is current
coin, but it may mean possessions expressible in
1noney values. 'Money' has no technical meaning,
but is of ambiguous import, and may be interpreted having regard to all surrounding circumstances under which it is used. 'Money' is often
and popularly used as equivalent to 'property'.
'~Ione~T' means wealth reckoned in terms of
money; capital considered as a cash asset; specifically such wealth or capital dealt in as a commodity to be loaned, invested, or the like; wealth
considered as a cash asset. 'Equivalent' means
equal in value, force, measure, power, and effect,
or having equal or corresponding import, meaning, or significance; what is virtually the same
thing; identical in effect. * * * ''
·'Blister copper has an established and readily ascertainable market value, and when the taxing authorities were apprised of the number of
pounds produced it was a simple matter to appraise its value in money.''
The cases cited by respondents are not in point. The
- case of Salt Lake County vs. Utah Copper Co., 294 Fed.
199, in which the case of Mercur Mining Co. vs. Juab
11
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Connt,\'· cited by respondents and other cases were re,·icwed and considered, held, to the contrary of respondents' contention, that ''the net annual proceeds of a mine
are the net proceeds of the sale of its product during
the tax year ''.
In that case it was contended by the County that the
statutes did not contemplate that tailings must be converted into cash before the proceeds tax would attach;
and the court held against the county. Yet this is the
authority cited by respondents.
In the case of Tintic Standard Mining Co. vs. Uhih
County, cited by respondents, the issue was as to the
propriety of certain deductions from gross proceeds
taken by the mining company and disallowed by the
Board of Equalization. The case did not involve any
question of the inclusion in gross proceeds of ores produced but not sold.
b. Respondents next say that notwithstanding the
allegations of the amended complaints here before the
court, the cases must be considered as though the pren1ium payments were made only after the ores had been
converted into the equivalent of money.
Respondents ignore the specific allegations as to how
these payments were made. For instance, in the case
of United States Smelting Refining and Mining Company, No. 7324, is to be put aside: the exhibits showing
the instructions from Metals Reserve Company; the
monthl:· affidavits filed by the smelting company showing that the quantities of metal reported as available
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for the payment of preinituns were deterinined by mine
production records; the allegations as to the manner
in \Yhich the ores were treated showing the processing
at the plant of the cmnpany at :Midvale, Utah, the shipment of the resultant product for refining at other plants
outside the State of Utah, and the date of payment of
premiums with relation to such dates of processing and
refining ; also the allegations that the premiums were
paid before any sale of the ores, were paid unconditionally, and without any right on the part of the federal
agency paying the same to recover them or any part
thereof in the event the ores were never sold.
Respondents ignore all this to look only to an allegation quoted at page 14 of their brief in which it was
succintly stated that monthly quotas were computed and
·premiums were paid on a specified percentage of the
metal contents of the qualified materials in the ores, and
that such metal contents were determined by sampling
and assaying before any conversion of the ores and before any processing of the ores other than such crushing is as required to permit of sampling for assaying.
This allegation respondents say is a mere ''conclusion of law". The allegation is one of fact as to the
time when certain things were done; it would be as
much a conclusion of law to say that one had breakfast
before having lunch.
But respondents say that the very question to be
determined here is whether or not there was a conversion of ores into money or the equivalent of money.
That is not the ultimate question to be determined:
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the question before this court is whether or not the
bonuses paid were any part of the gross proceeds realized from the sale or conversion into money or its equivalent of ores produced by appellants. We submit that under
the admitted facts pleaded in these cases now before
the court, it cannot ~eriously be contended that the subsidies were any part of such gross proceeds.
c. Finally, respondents argue that it is immaterial
whether the ores were converted or sold; and "When
the ores were taken out of the mine and were sent to
the smelter or mill, such ores immediately had a value
in addition to their ceiling price, namely, the amount
which was payable for such ores as premium payments".
(p. 17)
Here again respondents simply beg the question as
to whether the subsidies were some part of the payment
made for the ores; or on the contrary were, as the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 authorized, as every rule
issued (except one rescinded portion of original Rule
13), and as every act done evidences, bonuses paid by
Government to ensure maximum production of certain
strategic materials, paid because the amounts realizable
fron1 the particular operations of a particular mine were
not sufficient to cover costs and ensure continued maximum production.

7.

The Constitutional Question. (P. 19)

Respondents state that they are content to rest the
question of the constitutionality of the inclusion of
pre1nium payments in computing the net proceeds tax

14
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valuation upon tlie decision of this court in "the Haynes
case".
It is true that in the Haynes case this Honorable
Court did consider on the fa.cts there presented the constitutionality of the inclusion of such premium payments.
It will be remembered that in the IIaynes case this
Honorable Court said that there either the pren1i11ms
were receiYed only on a sale of the ores or were received
only after the ores had been converted into the equivalent
of money; and therefore the subsidies were properly
treated as part of the proceeds from the mine.
In the Haynes ease no question of subsidies other
than premiums payable under the initial quotas established was presented. The court did not then have, as it
now has, the full story of the basis on which subsidies
were paid; the determination and revision of quotas,
the reports required from each individual mining company showing its own costs of operation and planned
development; the elaborate calculations by the federal
agencies required to estimate the subsidies needed to be
made to each mining company in order to make up
the deficits over and above the amounts receivable from
mine operations and permit of continued operations; the
times and conditions of payment, as for instance, retroactive ·payments to make up for increased labor costs;
and the reduction in quotas and consequently in subsidies
paid when either through increased production or reduced costs a mine more nearly carried itself.
Upon the records here presented, it is submitted
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that premium payments, so-called, made under the authority of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,
authorizing the making of subsidy payments when necessary to obtain maximum necessary production of any
commodity, are clearly no part of the amount received
on either a sale of ores, or on the conversion of ores
into the equivalent of money. On the contrary, the subRidies were what had to be added to all such receipts to
permit of continued mine operation.
\Ve submit that the question of the constitutionality
of the inclusion of such subsidy payments in the measure
of value should be reviewed and considered by this Honorable Court. Now that the true nature of the subsidies
is disclosed to this court, it would well appear that they
were no more a part of the value of each mining property
than a $5.00 bounty for killing the animal would remake the coyote's $1.00 pelt into a $6.00 value. True,
the owner-killer might realize $6.00 by collecting the
hounty and selling the pelt to the furrier; but the proceeds from the sale of the pelt would remain the same,
be the bounty what it may.
Respectfully submitted,
CHENEY, MARR, \VILKINS & CANNON,
Attorneys for Chief Consoli~at!ed Illining
Company and United States Smelting
Be finJing arnd M irving Com.pany
RAY, RAWLINS, JONES & HENDERSON,
Attorneys for Park Ut'a.h Oonsolid1ated
Mines C om,p1any
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R. J. HOGAN,
Attorney for Silver Ki.ng Coalition Mines
Company
C. C. PARSONS,
'V.JL 1\I. McCREA,
~-\..D. ~:t:OFFAT,

CAL YIN A. BEHLE,
Attorneys for Kennecott Copper Corporation.
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